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genious manipulation" to diminish the value of the estate of the
wife and mother. The strong statement by the court in approv-
ing the commissioner's action follows:
"We refuse to sanction and approve the method or scheme
adopted by the defendant in his efforts to retain control and
management of the property which rightfully belonged to
his wife's estate, although such procedure may have been
legal, or to sanction and approve his failure to account there-
for after his usufruct had been terminated by his remar-
riage."8 2
The case entitled Succession of Dielmanns held that a perfect
usufruct of bank stock was converted into an imperfect usufruct
of the proceeds therefrom when the change was brought about
by liquidation of tile bank, a matter over which the usufructuary
had no control. This situation was clearly distinguished from





Gulf Refining Company v. Garrett" arose as a concursus
proceeding to determine ownership of royalties. The Court of
Appeal of. the Second Circuit reached a judgment in Gulf Re-
fining Company v. Garrett2 in 1943, which was reversed by the
supreme court and remanded to the district court in 1946. Three
dissents are listed on the first hearing by the supreme court and
two upon the rehearing, the last upon the matter of remanding
without request. While it might be said that no definite conclu-
sions were reached under these circumstances, the discussions
by various members of the court are most interesting and im-
portant since the underlying question is one of interpretation of
the old "mine and quarry article," 552 of the Civil Code, which
appears as follows:
"The usufructuary has a right to the enjoyment and proceeds
of mines and quarries in the land subject to the usufruct, if
* Professor of Civil Law, Louisiana State University.
82. 26 So.(2d) 829, 886 (La. 1946).
38. 119 La. 101, 43 So. 972 (1907).
1. 209 La. 674, 25 So. (2d) 329 (1945).
2. 24 So. (2d) 682 (La. App. 1943).
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they were actually worked before the commencement of the
usufruct; but he has no right to mines and quarries not open-
ed."
All of the old doubts and fears regarding this article have
been freshly stirred by the case which presented for immediate
consideration a contract between the widow, second wife of
Garrett, and his children and grandchildren by a previous mar-
riage. The original leases were made upon property of the sec-
ond community by the husband. The first was not in question.
The second expired after his death and an extension was signed
by the widow and heirs after which a producing well was drilled.
The husband left a will in which he apparently tried to bequeath
the usufruct of the land upon which the oil lease rested to his
widow. The widow and heirs, in doubt about the validity of the
testamentary bequest, agreed not to probate the instrument and
entered into a contract whereby the widow was to have "the
use of the property ... during her entire lifetime, and from
which she shall have the revenues." Did the contract mean that
the widow was to have the usufruct or more than usufruct and,
if usufruct, were royalties from the mineral leases included.
Obviously, the words of the contract, which caused the greatest
trouble were "use" and "revenues." The district court interpreted
the instrument to mean a conveyance of the usufruct which
under 552 would not give the widow enjoyment of revenues ac-
cruing from the well drilled after the death of the husband. The
Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, found the words of the contract
clear and explicit, deplored the unnecessary complexity intro-
duced by injection of usufruct and found that since revenues=
rents which=royalties that the widow was entitled to the oil
production from the land.
On the first hearing by the supreme court evidence to show
the intention of the parties as disclosed by actions indicating
their original interpretation was evaluated. The rule that a
gratuitous contract should be construed against the recipient
was stated. Having concluded that the contract should rule and
that usufruct was intended, the court proceeded to a discussion
of whether the usufructuary was entitled to the royalties from
the leases. Article 552 was applied and royalties from a shallow
well producing before the usufruct began, about which there
was really no dispute, were given to the usufructuary while the
royalties from the well drilled after the death of the husband
under the lease extension, really a new lease, to which the usu-
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fructuary's consent has, been procured, were given to the naked
owners. On second hearing, the majority decided to remand for
further evidence regarding the intention of the parties to the
contract.
It seems fortunate to the writer at least, that the case turned
on an interpretation of the contract with remand to ascertain
intention. Thus was avoided a definitive decision involving ap-
plication of this article which is well known to have been in
disrepute and considered obsolete by most French advisors at
the time of the drafting of the Code Napoleon.8 It is of Roman
origin .and evolved during a period when mines and quarries
were worked by hand and were considered inexhaustible. Article
551, which immediately precedes the "mine and quarry" article
and is clearly the companion, reads as follows:
"The usufructuary has the right to draw all the profits
which are usually produced by the thing subject to the usu-
fruct.
"Accordingly he may cut trees on land of which he has
the usufruct, take from it earth, stones, sand and other ma-
terials, but for his use only, and for the amelioration and cul-
tivation of the land, provided he act in that respect as a pru-
dent administrator, and without abusing this right."
Earth, stone, sand-taken from the earth-are certainly like
oil, likewise taken from the earth and in no case fruits, which
are "born and reborn of the soil." In perfect accord is Article 533,
emphasized by Chief Justice O'Niell, which denies the usufruc-
tuary, owner of a perfect usufruct, to change the substance. It
seems clear to the writer at least that the usufructuary has no
ownership of commercial quantities of oil or gas produced from
a lease, in existence when the usufruct begins, whether in pro-
duction or not but does have imperfect usufruct of the oil or gas,
a consumable, the rules concerning which are explicit in the
Code. The second paragraph of 533 especially excepts the pro-
hibition of the first paragraph from imperfect usufruct.
The right of the usufructuary to production from the lease
in existence before the term of usufruct began was not at issue
in this case as production was small and the ownership was con-
ceded.
The second stipulation of the "mine and quarry" article, 552,
. See Daggett, Mineral Rights in Louisiana (1939) 226 et seq., and
French authorities cited therein.
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was the one under discussion, dealing with the mine, which ob-
viously is not a mine, not open at the beginning of the term of
the usufruct. The widow and heirs, signed the extension of the
lease after the death of the husband and father. Without consent
of the usufructuary who could prevent entry upon the land under
usufruct, a valid lease or extension could not have been given.
If the "sole motive" of her signing was in erroneous belief that
she was entitled to returns from the land under her usufruct,
then the validity of the lease would be in doubt. Perhaps a re-
view of the facts regarding the understanding of the parties
when the lease extension was signed, as applied to the previously
made contract, will give more light on the subject. Whatever
criticism might be made of the procedure adopted by the court,
certainly its earnest effort to prevent valuable substantive rights
being fixed by use of superficial words of convenience is most
heartening. The word "mine" as applied to an oil or gas well and
the word "rent" as applied to royalties, percentages of oil and
gas production, were used to phrase a new pattern and should
not be permitted to determine the nature of the fabric. Should
that be done it would be but a submission to the Tyranny of
Words as expounded by Stuart Chase and authorities on seman-
tics, the science of meaning.
Interpretation
Three suits were consolidated in Dobbins v. Hodges.4 Plain-
tiffs, landowners, asked to have certain mineral deeds cancelled
as prescribed for ten years non-use. The defendants relied upon
a lease wherein the landowners and mineral owners had joined
which was alleged to bind all parties. It was so held. The owners
of the several interests had unitized and integrated or pooled
their holdings under the common lease and agreed to divide the
royalties proportionately and were bound by their contract as
indicated in Robinson v. Horton.5 The one holder who had not
signed the pooling agreement was also bound by it as he had
accepted his part of the royalty as allocated under the terms of
the lease contract.
Another unitization agreement was under interpretation in
Jackson v. Hunt Oil Company.6 Defendant has been given the
option in the agreement to which plaintiffs were parties to unit-
4. 208 La. 143, 23 So.(2d) 26 (1945)..
5. 197 La. 919, 2 So.(2d) 647 (1941).
6. 208 La. 156, 23 So.(2d) 31 (1945).
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ize its forty acre tract with either of the two forty acre tracts
owned by plaintiffs. After election and compliance plaintiffs
urged that the agreement had the effect of creating two separate
leases, one of which had lapsed. A specific clause of the agree-
ment negated this plea. The following clause was under inter-
pretation in Krauss v. Fry;7 "It is understood and agreed by and
between the vendor and vendees herein that the said vendor
does hereby reserve one-half (1/2) of all the oil, gas and other
mineral rights in, under and that may be produced from the
above described lands.""
The vendor owned an undivided one-half of the land sold.
The court decided that he meant to reserve and did reserve unto
himself one-half of the minerals in the one-half conveyed, that
is, but one-fourth of the whole.
A plea for cancellation of a lease for non-compliance with its
terms or in the alternative for additional compensation was
heard in Rudnick v. Union Producing Company." The clause
under consideration appears as follows:
"... as additional consideration, lessee agrees that if any well
drilled on the above described property makes or produces
not less than fifty (50) barrels and not over one hundred
(100) barrels of oil per day, to pay to lessor four thousand
dollars ($4,000.00); if any well drilled on said property makes
or produces over one hundred (100) barrels and not over two
hundred fifty (250) barrels of oil per day, to pay to lessor ten
thousand dollars ($10,000.00); if any well drilled on said
property makes or produces over two hundred fifty (250)
barrels of oil per day, to pay lessors twenty thousand dollars
($20,000.00); to be more explicit whichever of the above sized
well (s) should come in first, that special size well shall set
the money consideration to be paid . . . .
The first well to come in never produced as much as fifty
barrels per day but the second well did. Defendants took the
position that the last, "to be more explicit," part of the quoted
provision released them from the additional compensation since
the first well never reached the fifty barrel bracket. The court
decided that the any well phrase ruled and the last statement
meant that the first well to reach any of the three categories
7. 209 La. 250, 24 So.(2d) 464 (1945).
8. 209 La. 254, 24 So.(2d) 466 (1945).
9. 209 La. 943, 25 So.(2d) 906 (1946).
10. 209 La. 943, 945, 25 So.(2d) 906-907.
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should set the amount of the additional compensation. In refus-
ing to cancel the lease the court said:
"In Louisiana, the right to dissolve a lease is subject to ju-
dicial control according to the circumstances. Brewer v. Forest
Gravel Company, Incorporated, 172 La. 828, 135 So. 372, and
cases there cited. In this case there were grounds for honest
doubt as to the rights of the parties. This Court has not, and
will not, penalize a litigant lessee by dissolving a lease held
technically in default when there is a bona fide defense."'"
The additional compensation was said to be "in the nature
of a promise to pay a definite amount on the happening of one of
the contingencies listed"'' 2 and hence was ruled by the ten year
prescription of Article 3544 and not lost under the three year rule.
The dispute in Book v. Schoonmaker3 arose over interpreta-
tion of a drilling contract and centered upon the following
clause: "Owner shall furnish to contractor gas for fuel from
owner's well on the Anders farm, about 1/2 miles West of the
location herein, contractor to lay line and make connections to
said gas well at his own risk and expense." 4 The gas well on the
Anders farm had failed and other fuel had to be supplied. The
contractor maintained that the owner should furnish it under the
above clause while the owner's position was that his obligation to
furnish was limited to production from the well on the Anders
farm. The court decided that the latter view was correct partic-
ularly in light of the parties' actions showing that to have been
their original interpretation. Article 1956 provides that: "When
the intent of the parties is doubtful, the construction put upon it,
by the manner in which it has been executed by both, or by one
with the express or implied assent of the other, furnishes a rule
for its interpretation."' 5
Farrell v. Simms 16 reiterates well established principles of
contract. Dispute arose over payment of royalties under a joint
lease and pooling agreement. The fact that certain lands were
non-contiguous and had not been drilled within ten years did not
11. 209 La. 943, 949, 25 So.(2d) 906, 908.
12. 209 La. 943, 949-950, 25 So.(2d) 906, 908.
13. 210 La. 94, 26 So.(2d) 366 (1946).
14. 26 So.(2d) 366, 368.
15. Art. 1956, La. Civil Code of 1870.
16. 209 La. 1072, 26 So.(2d) 143 (1946).
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affect the indivisible contract alive under its terms. The court
stated that:
"The rights of the parties in this suit are not governed by
the law of servitude but by the law the parties made for
themselves in a joint and indivisible contract. They provided
in their contract that the production on any part of the land
would keep the lease alive as to the whole. Having so con-
tracted, they are bound by their own agreement.""'
Prescription
The purpose of suit in Allison v. Wideman8 was to interrupt
the running of the ten years acquirendi prescription. Defendants,
in possession of the land under title containing no mention of
the outstanding mineral servitude were held to be in possession
of the mineral rights and could be pursued in a petitory action
under Article 43 of the Code of Practice, as the mineral interest
of plaintiff was an incorporeal real right under Act 205 of 1938.1'
Suit was originally filed by those persons, coproprietors of the
mineral interest, under the indivisibility 'theory of the Sample
v. Whitaker cases20 that suspension for minority of the liberandi
prescription would also suspend as to major co-owners. The
hearing of the suit was delayed because one of the attorneys was
in the armed forces and during the interval Act 232 of 194421 was
passed, depriving co-owners of the advantage of suspension by
virtue of the right of another. The statute provided for effect
against existing rights, and gave but one year within which those
rights could be exercised. Attorneys conceded that the suit had
abated as to the major co-owners.
The minor had filed two days before her twenty-second
birthday and hence was in time to interrupt the ten year ac-
quirendi prescription under the provisions of Article 3478 as
amended by Act 161 of 1920 and Act 64 of 1924. Under the libera-
tive prescription of ten years non-user, the minor's right was
suspended, apparently for ten years from her twenty-first birth-
day. Facts are not recited in the opinion as to how the minor
originally acquired the interest nor at what age. The suggested
period smacks of interruption but probably would be clarified if
all facts were stated. Since attorneys for plaintiff conceded that
17. 209 La. 1072, 1082, 26 So.(2d) 143, 146.
18. 210 La. 314, 26 So.(2d) 826 (1946).
19. Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 4735.4, 4735.5.
20. 172 La. 722, 135 So. 38 (1931) and 174 La. 245, 140 So. 36 (1932).
21. Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1946) §§ 4826.3-4826.4.
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the mineral interests of the major co-owners had abated, the
court's interpretation of the second section of Act 232 of 194422
is not available to interested persons. The implication here is
that the only way to have "exercised" rights under the saving
clause would have been by user, since this suit had been filed
even before the passage of the act.2"
Compulsory Pooling
Suit to cancel a mineral lease on the ground that the five
year primary term had elapsed for failure to drill or produce
failed in Crichton v. Lee.24 The lease was confected prior to the
effective date of the compulsory pooling statute, Act 157 of 1940,25
but was included in an order of the commissioner of conservation
directing unitization of certain lands for the purpose of recycling
of gas and extraction of liquid hydrocarbons. Returns to all
owners had been increased by the operation of the plant. Plain-
tiffs had been tendered their proportionate shares of the royalties
but had refused them. Their pleas of having been deprived of
their property without due process of law by exercise of the
police power without public interest were denied under the line
of cases establishing the constitutionality of compulsory pooling
for conservation whether affecting past or future leases. Two
interesting issues as to the commissioner's having exceeded his
power and as to whether an order limited to two sands could
hold all sands, could not be passed upon by the supreme court
as they had not been urged below or raised by the pleadings.
Privilege
A producing well was attached in Standard Supply and Hard-
ware Company, Incorporated, v. Humphrey Brothers26 under
Act 232 of 1916.27 Defendants had failed to record a bond after a
contractor drilling their leases had filed a lien in November 1941
and plaintiffs maintained that this failure made them liable for
the value of the supplies furnished. Defendants had also failed
to formally accept the work in compliance with 232 of 1916 and
hence the filing of plaintiff's lien on September 7, 1943, was
alleged to have been in time. Defendants moved to dissolve the
attachment on the ground that Act 100 of 194028 superceded 232
22. Ibid.
23. Art. 3518, La. Civil Code of 1870 and La. Act 39 of 1932.
24. 209 La. 561, 25 So.(2d) 229 (1946).
25. Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1946) §§ 4741.11, 4741.13-4741.31.
26. 209 La. 979, 26 So.(2d) 8 (1946).
27. Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 5091-5097.
28. Dart's Stats. 5101.1-5101.5, 5101.20.
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of 1916 and that the plaintiff's lien had not been filed in time
under 100 of 1940. Apparently influenced by the statute dealing
with liens in connection with building contracts, an interpreta-
tion of which was handed down on the same day, the court de-
cided that the pertinent provision of the 1916 act had not been
superseded by Act 100 of 1940.
The court said, "We cannot believe the Legislature ever in-
tended to grant less protection to furnishers of materials under
drilling contracts than that granted to furnishers of materials
under building contracts." 20 The purport of Act 161 of 1932 ap-
peared to have been to unify the previously existing acts"0 on the
subject matter with slightly different treatment. Acts 145 of
1934 and 100 of 1940 followed and were then replaced by 68 of
194231 which specifically repeals 145 of 1934 and 100 of 1940.
Greater protection, rather than less, has been marked in the
evolution of the statutes. This decision indicating the continued
life of 232 of 1916 again instances the value of specific repeal by
number, if, indeed, the legislature intended the previous series of
statutes to be contained in one act dealing with a full coverage
of subject matter.
Damages
Three items were allowed and three refused in Layne Louisi-
ana Company v. Superior Oil Company,32 a damage suit, arising
out of the defendants illegal entry upon plaintiff's land and the
making of a geophysical survey of the land, which was adjacent
to lands leased by defendant. The first item allowed was five
dollars per acre, loss of value for leasing purposes. It was clear
that the survey was deliberate and for purpose of obtaining
information valuable to defendant in making its proposed lease
block. During the six months elapsing after the survey and
before filing of suit, plaintiff received no offers for lease and
defendant abandoned the contemplated block. All of this news
quickly circulated and was of unquestionable damage to plaintiff
as it was of value to defendant. Since five dollars per acre had
been paid for leases in the area prior to this episode and indeed
had been paid by defendant for the very privilege which it pur-
ported to take from plaintiff for nothing, the sum was considered
fair in compensation. The second item allowed was for value
29. 209 La. 979, 987, 26 So.(2d) 8, 11 (1946).
30. Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 5101.1-5101.4.
31. Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1946) §§ 5101.6-5101.12.
32. 209 La. 1014, 26 So.(2d) 20 (1946).
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of cattle which had escaped from the fenced area by virtue of
defendant's trespass and the third item was for damage to
woods, gates, et cetera.
The court refused to allow damages for the acreage already
under lease as the reversionary value for releasing was too
speculative both as to whether it would ever revert in the first
place and second as to possible leasing value if and when it did.
Royalty value was also refused as no appreciable market value
could be proved nor could it be shown that the survey had
affected the value in any way. The court pointed out that "the




State v. Golden' presented the issue whether a marriage
celebrated in violation of Article 92 of the Civil Code is null.
The article forbids priests, ministers, and magistrates to marry
males under eighteen or females under sixteen years of age. It
does not contain language indicating nullity of such marriages.
Nor does it contain within itself any reference which would lead
to that conclusion, such as a declaration that the ages listed are
the minimum ages for marriage. The only reason for inferring
nullity of the marriage celebrated in violation of Article 92 would
be the article's position in the same chapter with other articles
on causes of nullity of marriage. The supreme court interpreted
the article literally as no more than a prohibition on celebrants
and accordingly decided the marriage was valid .2 It was affirmed
by implication in State v. Priest.3
The marriage issue in Cameron v. Rowland4 was one of fact
only, whether the plaintiff's mother and alleged father, both de-
ceased, had ever married. There being no direct proof of the fact
of marriage, the court relied on the general reputation which the
parties enjoyed and numerous acts of the parties indicative of
33. 209 La. 1014, 1027, 26 So.(2d) 20, 24.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. State v. Golden, 26 So. (2d) 837 (La. 1946).
2. The case will be more fully discussed in a note in the March issue of
the Review.
3. 27 So. (2d) 173 (La. 1946). See discussion of case infra, page 226.
4. 208 La. 663, 23 So. (2d) 285 (1945).
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